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Balancing Prejudice in Admitting Prior Felony
Convictions in Civil Actions: Resolving
the 609(a)(1) - 403 Conflict
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence grants a trial judge several grounds for exercising discretion in excluding otherwise relevant evidence from admissibility.' The rule was adopted to preserve the broad
2
levels of discretion given trial judges by previously-developed case law.
Congress believed that the trial judge could best interpret and respond
to the evidentiary problems that develop in an individual case; 3 hence,
Rule 403 was adopted to provide guidance to the judge in fulfilling her
judicial obligations 4 by allowing for a balancing of trial concerns against
probative value.
Although Rule 403 is generally interpreted to be a rule of exclusion
that "cuts across the rules of evidence," 5 the rule was "designed as a
1

Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
The rule was designed to guard against the admission of evidence that creates jury prejudice.
See generally Gold, FederalRule of Evidence 403: Observations On the Nature of Unfairly PreudicialEvidence,
58 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1983). Prejudicial evidence is believed to "cause the jury to regard the [person against whom the evidence is offered] as a bad person... and to conclude that he should be
punished." Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of
Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 561 (1984).
2 See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 138 (4th ed. 1986)
(hereinafter referred to as SALTZBURG & REDDEN) (Rule 403 states the common law powers of the
trial judge "as explicitly as they have ever been stated.") See also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 185 at 545 (3d ed. 1984); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1977).
3 Appellate courts show great deference to a trial judge's decision under Rule 403, and the trial
judge's weighing of evidence against the Rule 403 criteria may not be disturbed on appeal unless the
judge clearly abused his discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820
(1984); and United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065
(1978).
4 The trialjudge has a general obligation under Federal Rule 102 to ensure the fair administration ofjustice. Rule 102 provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
FED. R. EID. 102.

At the same time, the trial court has an obligation to protect witnesses from harassment and
undue embarrassment under Rule 611 (a), which provides:
(a) CONTROL BY COURT. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EVID. 611(a). See generally United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir.) (indicating
that the flexibility allowed the trial judge under Rule 403 "is essential in any set of procedural or
evidentiary rules"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980).
5 Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983), citing Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332, 1347 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that evidence admissible under Rule 803 should prop-
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guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have been
formulated." 6 Thus, courts do not apply Rule 403 where a more specific
rule of admissibility would apply. 7 However, courts have had problems
in defining whether a particular rule of evidence is "more specific" so as
to preempt application of the balancing test prescribed under Rule 403.
Rule 609, which deals with the admissibility of prior conviction evidence
for impeachment purposes, 8 has stirred particular controversy. 9
Part I of this Note briefly describes the development of admitting
prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes. Part II considers
the interpretive problems encountered with the adoption of the language
in Rule 609(a). Part III then examines the current dilemma between
erly have been excluded under Rule 403). The Shows court seems to advocate applying Rule 403
anytime a court is faced with determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. See
id. However, most courts generally adopt the position that Rule 403 should be applied only when a
more specific evidentiary rule does not exist. See infra note 7. For a discussion of Shows on the
609(a) - 403 issue, see text accompanying notes 116-119, infra.
6 FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
7 See United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.) (indicating that Rule 403 cannot override a
more specific rule such as 609(a)(2)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983). In addition, because Rule 403
is accepted as a rule of exclusion rather than admission, when another rule bars the admission of
evidence in a trial, the trial judge has no discretion under Rule 403 or any other rule to admit it. See
SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2, at 141. The rule does not even need to be one of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Southern Pacific Transp., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 1980)
(indicating that Rule 403 cannot be used to admit evidence of disability payments in FELA actions).
8 Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. For purpose of attacking credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (I) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) TIME LIMIT. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible ifa period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests ofjustice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is
not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence.
(c) EFFECT OF PARDON, ANNULMENT, OR CERTIFICATE OF REHABILITATION. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (I) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS. Evidence ofjuvenile adjudications is generally not admis-

sible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) PENDENCY OF APPEAL. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evi-

dence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
FED. R. EvID. 609.

9 See infra notes 84-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 609(a) controversy as is
evidenced by inconsistent court interpretation and treatment. See also ABA LITIGATION SECTION,
EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 159-73 (1983) for additional discussion of

the controversy at the circuit court level.
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Rules 609(a) and 403, as illustrated by the inconsistent treatment courts
and commentators have given prior conviction evidence in civil cases.
Part IV discusses the policy implications of interpreting Rule 609(a) to
require blanket admissibility, without the discretionary balancing of trial
concerns mandated under Rule 403. Finally, Part V proposes a legislative amendment to resolve the 609(a)(1)-403 conflict in civil cases. This
Note concludes that, until amendment, the conflict should be resolved by
viewing Rule 403 as underlying all of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
applying to all questions of admissibility unless another, more specific
rule applies in its stead. Since Rule 609(a)(1) does not preempt Rule 403
either by its language or by its congressional intent, Rule 403 should be
applied in the civil context.
I.

The Development of the Use of Prior Conviction Evidence for
Impeachment in Civil Trials

At early common law, a person with a prior conviction was incompetent to testify at trial.1° Such disqualification was originally viewed as
part of the punishment for the previous crime, II but a theory soon developed that viewed a person with a prior conviction as unworthy of telling
the truth. Under this theory, convicted criminals were viewed as "so destitute of moral honesty that truth could not within them dwell."' 2 Subsequently, however, courts adopted a rule which permitted a witness with a
prior conviction to testify, but which also allowed evidence of the witness' prior conviction to be admitted to impeach his or her credibility.' 3
The purpose behind this rule was to provide the jury with all available
4
information that could affect a witness' credibility.1
10 The rationale for this view was that illegal behavior demonstrates readiness to do evil, which
thereby infers a general readiness to lie. See State v. Ennis, 142 Ariz. 311, 689 P.2d 570, 575 (Ct.
App. 1984). This was particularly true of "infamous crimes," which involved a felony, treason or
crimen falsi. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 174 (1940). Crimen falsi is
a crime involving deceit, untruthfulness or interference with the court's ascertainment of truth. See
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining the development of the
term crimen falsi). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 43 at 93 (describing disqualification because
of prior conviction as "primitive absolutism").
11 See 2J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
12 Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1924). See generally Note, State v. Martin:
Denial of Advance Rulings on Admissibility of Prior Convictionsfor Impeachment Purposes: Chilling Effect on
Defendant's Right to Testify?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 477, 480 (1984); Surratt, Prior-ConvictionImpeachment
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule
609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 907, 910 (1980).
13 Williams, 3 F.2d at 130. See also Ladd, supra note 10, at 174-84; Bridge, Burdens Within Burdens
at a Trial Within a Trial, 23 B.C.L. REV. 927, 950 (1982).
14 See generally 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 314-15 (1979) (hereinafter
referred to as LourSEu. & MUELLER). See also State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956),
where the court stated:
The object of a trial is not solely to surround an accused with legal safeguards but also to
discover the truth. What a person is often determines whether he should be believed....
No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is
asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing
that they would wish to know.
Id at 293; 123 A.2d at 746.
However, today it is generally recognized that a single act, particularly one which is remote in
time or circumstance, may be atypical of a witness' character. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[02], at 609-60 (1987) (hereinafter referred to as WEINSTEIN & BERGER).
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Since prior conviction evidence was automatically admissible, without discretion, to impeach a witness' credibility under this rule, criminal
defendants became reluctant to testify on their own behalf for fear that
the introduction of a prior conviction would implicate their guilt in the
crime charged.1 5 Recognizing the criminal defendant's dilemma, in 1965
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
in Luck v. United States,16 held that it was within the discretion of the trial
judge to exclude evidence of a prior conviction of a defendant-witness if
the evidence was offered for impeachment purposes. 17 The court reasoned that because the District's impeachment statute used permissive
rather than mandatory language in allowing evidence of a witness' prior
criminal conviction to be admitted on the issue of his or her credibility as
a witness,' 8 the trial court still had discretion to exclude such evidence
when introduced.' 9
The view expounded in Luck emphasized avoiding prejudice to a
criminal defendant even at the cost of excluding otherwise relevant evidence. The court stressed that "[i]t is more important to the search for
truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to
know of a prior conviction." ' 20 In a subsequent case, 2' the District of
Columbia Circuit elaborated that even if the probative value outweighs
the prejudicial effect, evidence of prior convictions should be excluded if
the trial court determines it would be better to have the accused testify
"than to have the accused remain silent due 2to his fear of being im'2
peached with evidence of a prior conviction."
15 See LOUrSELL & MUELLER, supra note 14, § 315 at 317-18. Defendant-witnesses also may refuse to take the stand to avoid embarrassing public disclosure of past antisocial behavior. See Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the SenateJudiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Dennis). In fact, several jury studies indicate that conviction rates for defendants whose prior convictions are admitted at a subsequent criminal trial are statistically higher than for defendants whose
prior convictions were never introduced. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
179-80, 389-90 (1966). Nonparties, too, may be discouraged from testifying because of their fear of
such impeachment, especially when the convictions are embarrassing. See G. JOSEPH & S.
SALTZBURG, 43 EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES 9 (1987) (hereinafter referred to as JOsEPH & SALTZBURG).
16 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
17 Id. at 768. The Luck court in part justified granting such discretion to exclude prior conviction evidence upon its belief that a witness' decision not to testify is detrimental to the judicial system's interest in discovering truth. Id. at 769.
18 The statute provided that evidence of a witness' prior conviction "may be given in evidence to
affect his credibility as a witness.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1961) (current version at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-305(b) (1973)).

19 348 F.2d at 767-68.
20 Id at 769.
21 See Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22 Id. at 245. The next year, the District of Columbia Circuit further clarified the Luck doctrine
by describing several factors for a court to consider in determining the admissibility of prior conviction evidence. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1968). These factors included: (1) the nature of the prior offense; (2) its similarity to the offense
charged (i.e., evidence of a prior conviction should be admitted "sparingly" if the prior crime was
the same crime as that with which the accused is presently charged; id at 940-41); and (3) the remoteness of time between the prior conviction and the present trial, id. at 940; see also Luck, 348 F.2d
at 769. The court also stressed that the accused bears the burden of persuading the trial judge that
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In spite of the Luck doctrine, the majority of courts continued to
admit prior felony 23 conviction evidence automatically, and Congress reinstated the majority rule in the District of Columbia by revising the District of Columbia Code. The revision replaced the former discretionary
language in the statute with language that mandated the admission of
24
prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes.
In 1973, with the introduction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, tension again mounted between the legal philosophies espoused by the majority and by the Luck doctrine. The first draft of Rule 609(a) proposed
the majority position, allowing for blanket admissibility of prior felony
convictions and crimes involving dishonesty or false statements. 2 5 The
second draft two years later, however, proposed judicial discretion similar to Luck, requiring that the probative value of the evidence be greater
than its prejudicial effect to be admissible. 26 Ultimately, the House of
Representatives passed a version of Rule 609(a) which totally excluded
evidence of a prior conviction that did not involve dishonesty or false
statement for impeachment purposes. 27 The Senate amended the House
version to adopt a position which again reflected the blanket admissibility
position of the majority. 28 Both houses of Congress eventually approved
the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction far outweighs its probative value. Gordon, 383 F.2d at
939-40.
Several states have adopted a slightly different list of factors for a court to consider in exercising
its discretion to exclude a prior conviction, including (1) the nature of the impeaching crime; (2) if
the witness is a party, the similarity of the crime with which the party is charged; (3) the impeachment value of the prior conviction; (4) its remoteness or proximity in time; (5) the witness' subsequent history, including the length of his or her criminal record; (6) the importance of the witness'
testimony; and (7) the centrality of the credibility issue. See State v. Edwards, 380 N.W.2d 503
(Minn. App. 1986); State v. Boucher, 144 Vt. 276, 478 A.2d 218 (1984).
23 Under federal law, a felony is "[a]ny offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year .... 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1982).
24 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973) (providing for the admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions if the offense "(A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of the punishment)").
25 The first draft of FED. R. EvID. 609(a) provided:
GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (I) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
46 F.R.D. 161, 295-96 (1969).
26 The second draft read as follows:
GENERAL RULE. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971).
27 The House version read: "GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved
dishonesty or false statement." H.R. REP. No. 93-65, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1973).
28 The Senate amendment provided that a witness' credibility may be attacked if the crime
(I) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law which he was
convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
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a compromise of the two positions, represented by the current language
29
of Rule 609(a).
II.

The Language of Rule 609(a): The Foundation for Interpretive
Problems and the Resulting Conflict with Rule 403

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) guides courts deciding whether to
admit prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes. Two categories of crimes may be used to impeach a witness under Rule 609(a):
(1) any felony, as defined by federal law, 30 and (2) any crime involving
dishonesty or false statement. 3 ' Crimes which involve dishonesty or false
statement are not subject to exclusion on the grounds of unfair prejudice
due to their particularly probative nature in establishing credibility. 32
NEws 7098, 7102. See infra notes 61-63 for discussion of the Senate amendment and adopted version of Rule 609(a).
29 A House-Senate Conference Committee was formed, which agreed on a compromise reflected
in the present language of FED. R. EvID. 609(a). In December 1974, the House and Senate each
approved Rule 609(a) as it emerged from that committee. See 120 CONG. REc. H40896 (daily ed.
Dec. 18, 1974) (House adoption); 120 CONG. REC. S40070 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974) (Senate adoption). For the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally, see Pub. L. 93-595 § 1, 88 Stat.
1929 (1975). For a more detailed explanation of the Conference Committee's role in the Rule 609
deliberations, see infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
30 See supra note 23 for the federal definition of a felony.
31 See supra note 10 for definition and explanation of crimen falsi crimes. However, it is important to note that crimes which are crimen falsi in one jurisdiction may not be crimen falsi crimes in
another. Representative Hogan indicated that the common law definition of crimen falsi is "any
crime which may injuriously affect the administration ofjustice, by the introduction of falsehood or
fraud." 120 CONG. REC. H2375-2376 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan). He
elaborated:
This definition has been held to include forgery, perjury, subornation or perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness or to accuse of
a crime, obtaining money under false pretenses, stealing, moral turpitude, shoplifting, intoxication, petit larceny, jury tampering, embezzlenent and filing a false estate tax return.
Idt
However, the traditional definition, "crimes involving dishonesty or false statement," was likely
intended by Congress, as there was no debate on the subject, id.at 2380 (statement of Rep. Danielson), and the Conference Committee's Report indicated that "[T]he Congress means crimes... the
commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7103.
32 The Conference Report explained that convictions involving dishonesty and false statement
are "peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule are always to be admitted. Thus judicial
discretion granted with respect to the admissibility of other prior convictions [i.e., under 609(a)(1)]
is not applicable to those involving dishonesty or false statement." Id.
Courts have adopted the Conference Committee's view of crimen falsi crimes in their interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), holding a prior conviction of a crimen falsi crime automatically admissible in
both civil and criminal cases, with no prejudicial balancing under Rule 403. See United States v.
Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir.) (general balancing of Rule 403 does not apply to impeachment by
crimen falsi convictions), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983). See also United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d
349 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156
(1982); United States v. Coats, 652 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Additionally, the court in United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
985 (1980), quoted the Conference Committee's language in deciding that Rule 609(a)(2) is outside
the scope of Rule 403. See 615 F.2d at 279. See also United States v. Phillips, 488 F. Supp. 508 (W.D.
Mo. 1980), and Comment, The Interactionof Rules 609(a)(2) and 403 of the FederalRules of Evidence: Can
Evidence of a PriorConviction Which Falls Within the Ambit ofRule 609(a)(2) be Excluded by Rule 403?, 50 U.
CINN. L. REV. 381, 386-876 (1981) for a good discussion of the Toney and Phillips decisions.
However, it is important to note that argument has been made that reliance on the language of
the Conference Committee Report is misplaced, and that Rule 403 should still underlie the admission of prior crimen falsi convictions. See Comment, supra, at 391-92. This argument focuses on the
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However, because felonies may or may not be probative of credibility,
Rule 609(a)(1) gives the trial judge discretion to balance the probative
value of admitting the prior felony conviction evidence against "its preju33
dicial effect to the defendant."
Because Rule 609(a)(1) is silent as to the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a nondefendant witness, a controversy has developed
as to whether Rule 609(a)(1) controls so as to preempt the application of
Rule 403 in civil cases, or whether prior conviction evidence in civil litigation is still subject to Rule 403's balancing of prejudicial effect with
probative value.3 4 To determine congressional intent on the issue, the
plain meaning of Rule 609(a)(1) and its legislative history are considered
next.
A.

The "Plain" Meaning of Rule 609(a)(1)'s Language

If the plain meaning of Rule 609(a)(1) mandated the exclusion of
35
prior conviction evidence, Rule 403 would clearly be inapplicable.
Likewise, if the language of the rule clearly and unequivocally provided
guidelines for the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in all situations, Rule 403 would arguably be inapplicable.3 6 However, the language of Rule 609(a) (1) neither addresses that rule's applicability to civil
cases nor expressly precludes the application of Rule 403 in such
37
actions.
The congressional intent behind Rule 609(a)(1)'s proper application
to civil litigants is unclear because of the rule's switch in focus from "witness" to "defendant." The rule states that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness .. ,"38 The plain
meaning of this language suggests that it may be used in both civil and
criminal cases. However, the rule goes on to qualify such admissibility,
and in the qualification language that follows it adopts what is arguably
"under this rule" language in the Report, arguing that such language does not mean that the discretion of Rule 403, which is not "under this rule," does not underlie Rule 609(a)(2) and apply to
crimen falsi crimes. lId at 392. Because this argument does not consider the full context of the
Conference Committee Report, as a legislative intent argument it is less than persuasive and has not
influenced any courts which have considered the Rule 609(a)(2) - 403 issue.
33 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (emphasis added). A controversy over how to handle possible derivative prejudice to a criminal defendant who himself does not testify has also arisen. Although the
House recognized that the prior conviction of a defense witness may have a prejudicial effect to the
defendant, see 120 CONG. REC. H40891 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate), the
adopted language of Rule 609(a) does not clearly reflect congressional intent in dealing with the
derivative prejudice issue. Thus, courts are not in total agreement as to whether Rule 609(a)'s prejudicial balancing standard applies only when the defendant himself is to testify and evidence of his
own prior conviction could cause prejudice against him, or whether it also applies when the prior
conviction of another witness who was called upon to testify could similarly cause prejudice to the
defendant. Consideration of the derivative prejudice issue, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 14, § 316 at 326 (briefly discussing treatment of the
spillover effect).
34 For the adopted language of Rule 403, see supra note 1. For a discussion of the developed
controversy, see infra notes 84-132 and accompanying text.
35 Rule 403 is a rule of exclusion, not of admission. See supra note 7.
36 A more specific rule overrides Rule 403's application. See supra note 7.
37 For the adopted language of Rule 609(a), see supra note 8.
38

FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
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an application solely to criminal cases. The rule provides that prior conviction evidence is admissible ". . . but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year ... and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant. . .. "39
The advisory committee's note to Rule 609 is similarly ambiguous,
stating, "[t]he proposed rule incorporates certain basic safeguards, in
terms applicable to all witnesses but ofparticularsignificance to an accused who
elects to testify." 40 It is unclear as to whether the "all witnesses" language used here refers to all witnesses in a criminal trial or all witnesses
in general, in either criminal or civil actions. The committee's general
notes for Rule 609 fail to suggest whether a trial judge should also apply
the prejudicial balancing standard described in 609(a)(1) to civil parties,
whether the prejudicial balancing formula described in Rule 403 should
be used instead, or whether no balancing for prejudicial effect to civil
litigants should take place at all. The advisory committee's note pertaining specifically to subdivision (a) of Rule 609 likewise makes no mention
of the rule's applicability to civil situations. 4 1 Thus, the plain meaning of
the 609 language, as described in the actual text of 609(a)(1) and in the
advisory committee's note regarding the rule, provides little guidance of
congressional intent as to Rule 403 preemption in civil cases.
B. The Ambiguous Legislative History of Rule 609(a)(1)
The congressional intent behind Rule 609(a)(1) is likewise not readily discernible from the legislative history of Rule 609(a).42 Although
Congress has clearly recognized that admitting evidence of a prior conviction may prejudice civil parties, 43 it still failed to mention the standard
for exclusion of such evidence in Rule 609. In considering the rule, legislators in both houses of Congress and the Conference Committee focused almost exclusively upon criminal proceedings.
1. Consideration of Rule 609 in the House of Representatives
As noted previously, 44 the first draft of Rule 609(a) from the Advisory Committee reflected the common-law rule of automatically admitting evidence of prior convictions if the convictions were for felony or
39 Id. at 609(a)(1).
40 Id. at 609 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
41

Id.

42 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), rqrintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 7098; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7051; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7075. See generally 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.01 (2d ed. 1987) (hereinafter MOORE & BENDIX).
43 For example, in civil trials character evidence, which includes evidence of prior convictions, is
inadmissible to show action "in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(a). This is because of the
danger of resulting prejudice from such evidence. See id. at 404 advisory committee's note. In addition, courts have recognized the possible danger in admitting character evidence in section 1983
actions. Both a plaintiff's prison disciplinary record, Lataille v. Ponte, 754 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir. 1985),
and a defendant's record of past abuse of authority, Tigges v. Cataldo, 611 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1979),
are inadmissible in such actions under Rules 404 and 403.
44 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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false statement crimes. 45 However, after reconsidering the dangers of
prejudice, the Advisory Committee revised its original proposal to include a balancing standard similar to that of Rule 403.46 This proposal
received strong criticism,

draft, 48

47

and the Committee subsequently reverted to

its first
which then went to the House Special Subcommittee on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws for consideration.
The House Special Subcommittee amended the Advisory Committee's version to again allow judges to balance the probative value of a
conviction against whatever unfair prejudice might stem from its admission.4 9 However, when the Subcommittee's version went to the House
Committee on the Judiciary, it was again amended-this time, to allow
admissibility only of convictions of crimen falsi crimes. 50 Following debate on an amendment that would have restored the Subcommittee's discretionary balancing version, 51 the House voted to accept the Judiciary
52
Committee's proposal.
There was only one indication of an intent to apply the Houseadopted Rule 609(a) to civil as well as to criminal actions. This reference
consisted of a few statements made by representatives in the early stages
of drafting,53 when the House was considering the blanket rules of ad45 The first draft of the rule gave judges no discretion to exclude prior convictions. The Advisory Committee maintained that although there are inherent dangers in the use of such evidence,
exclusion was not justified, since the "[d]angers of unfair prejudice ... tend to disappear or diminish." Rule 609(a) advisory committee's note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 296-97 (1969).
46 See supra note 26 for the actual language of the Advisory Committee's second draft. See also
Rule 609(a) advisory committee's note, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391-92 (1971), indicating that the Advisory
Committee incorporated basic safeguards into the rule, "in terms applicable to all witnesses but of
particular significance to the accused who elects to testify."
47 For example, Senator McClellan, who was then chairman of the Judiciary Committee, called
the proposal "a direct assault on the will of Congress as recently expressed" by the rejection of the
Luck doctrine the year before. See 117 CONG. REC. S29894 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971).
48 See 56 F.R.D. 183, 269-70 (1972).
49 See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7075, 7084.

50 The Committee believed that because of the danger of unfair prejudice and the possible deterrent effect of allowing a witness to be impeached by prior felony convictions in general, crossexamination by evidence of prior conviction should be limited to those types of convictions bearing
directly on credibility, i.e. crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. Id at 12, reprintedat 708485.
51 This amendment was offered by Rep. Smith as a substitute for an earlier amendment introduced by Rep. Hogan. The Hogan amendment provided that prior conviction evidence was admissible to attack the credibility of a witness if the crime was either a felony or involved dishonesty or false
statement. Rep. Smith substituted an amendment that still allowed prior convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement to be admissible, but which qualified the admissibility of prior
felony convictions. Under the Smith amendment, prior felony convictions were admissible "unless
the court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction." See 120 CONG.REC. H2377 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
52 The final vote in the House was 377 in favor, 13 against, and 39 not voting. Id. at H2393-94.
53 See 120 CONG. REC. H2376 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan) (indicating that
"the committee's version of the rule applies to all witnesses, not only defendant witnesses, and it
applies to civil as well as criminal cases"); id.at H2377 (statement of Rep. Dennis) (emphasizing that
"it does not apply only to a man who is a defendant in a criminal case, but it applies to any witness");
id. at H2379 (statement of Rep. Hogan) (noting "[t]his applies in civil cases as well as criminal cases
to all witnesses"); id. (statement of Rep. Wiggins) (urging that "further draftsmanship is necessary to
spin off criminal cases from civil cases, to separate the nonparty witness problem from the party
witness problem"); id at H2381 (statement of Rep. Lott) (stressing that "it is essential to recognize
that this is a rule that would have application in both civil and criminal cases, and which would apply
not only to witnesses for the defense, but witnesses for the plaintiff or the prosecution as well"). For
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mission and exclusion. 5 4 The Conference Committee rejected these
blanket rules seven years later when it drafted the present rule, making
no mention of the rule's applicability in civil trials. 55 Thus, the statements made by representatives in the House provide little support for
the position that Congress intended Rule 609 to apply to civil as well as
56
to criminal actions.
2.

Senate Consideration

The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the House version of Rule
609(a) because it thought the dangers of unfair prejudice were greatest
when the witness was also a criminal defendant. 5 7 The Committee proposed a rule whereby criminal defendants could be impeached only by
58
prior convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.
Prior convictions would be admissible to impeach all other witnesses, including witnesses in civil actions, only when the probative value of the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. 59 When the Committee's proposal was debated on the Senate floor, however, the civil case scenario
again went unmentioned, with the debate focusing exclusively on the ef60
fect of prior conviction impeachment in criminal cases.
The Senate rejected the Judiciary Committee's proposal and passed
an amendment that applied the common-law view: all evidence of prior
convictions was admissible automatically. 61 However, the Senate was not
in full agreement on this amendment, 6 2 and several members strongly
argued that discretion was needed at the trial court level. 6 3 Ultimately,

a detailed contextual analysis of these statements, see Smith, Impeaching the Merits: Rule 609(a)(1) and
Civil Plaintiffs, 13 N. Ky. L. REv. 441, 447-52 (1987).
54 Both of these proposed rules created one standard for the admission of all prior felony convictions at all trials. See generally H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973) and 120 CONG.
REc. H2375-76 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
55 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
56 See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2, at 520, for an argument that courts tend to place too
much emphasis on individual remarks of the legislators.
57 In the committee's view, the danger of prejudice was greater when the accused, as opposed to
other witnesses, testifies because the jury may be prejudiced both on the question of credibility and
on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. CODE & ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7060-61.
58 The Senate Judiciary Committee thus agreed with the House limitation that only offenses
involving false statement or dishonesty could be used. See id. at 14, reprinted at 7061. By "crimes
involving false statement or dishonesty," the committee meant crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or "any other offense, in the nature of crimen false the commission of which involves some element of
untruthfulness, deceit, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully." Id.
59 Id.
60 See 120 CONG. REC. S37076-80 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974).
61 This amendment was known as the McClellan amendment. See 120 CONG. REC. S37083 (daily
ed. Nov. 22, 1974). A similar version of Rule 609 had been submitted to Congress by the Supreme
Court. Id. at S37075-76, S37083.
62 The final vote of approval was 38 Senators in favor to 33 against, with 29 Senators not present
for the vote. Id. at S37083.
63 Senator Burdick, for example, indicated that "[wiejust cannot say that we should use all prior
behavior or no prior behavior.... It seems to me that the solution here.., is to leave it to the sound
discretion of the trial judge." Id. at S37077 (statement of Sen. Burdick). Senator Biden similarly
criticized the McClellan amendment, indicating that under that amendment, "if you have once committed a crime, ...
you have lost your credibility forever.
Id. at S37082 (statement of Sen.
Biden).
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the versions of Rule 609(a) emerging from both the House and the Senate were submitted for consideration by the Conference Committee.
3.

The Conference Committee's Solution: Ambiguous Compromise
A Conference Committee was formed to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of Rule 609 and all of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.64 Obviously, compromises occurred between House
and Senate versions of the various rules, includifig Rule 609.65 Senator
McClellan indicated that "[n]either side [House or Senate] .

.

. got all

they wanted," 6 6 and the Chairman of the Conference Committee, Representative Hungate, noted "[t]he conference rule 609(a) strikes a middle
ground between the [House and Senate] versions ....

,,67

Several legislators on the Conference Committee focused their remarks exclusively on the rule's applicability in criminal cases. 68 The
Committee itself used language related to criminal trials in their Committee Report, and even specified that the prejudicial effect to be
weighed against the probative value of the prior conviction evidence was
"specifically the prejudicial effect to the defendant. '69 The committee
found that the need for the jury to have information about the credibility
70
of a nondefendant witness outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.
The report indicates specifically that "[t]he danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant . . . was considered and rejected by the
Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility.... ,,71 However, this reference to nondefendant witnesses taken in
context does not refer to civil parties, but rather only to prosecution wit72
nesses in criminal trials.
Additionally, although Representative Hungate indicated that the
adopted Rule 609(a) was "as close or closer to the House version than to
the Senate's," 7 3 this view is at variance with indications made in the Conference Committee Report which suggest that the Senate version was ultimately the version adopted. 74 Thus, it is likely that "those who voted to
64 120 CONG. REC. H40890 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate). Members of
the Conference Committee included Senators Eastland, McClellan, Hart, Ervin, Burdick, Hruska,
Thurmond, and Scott and Representatives Hungate, Kastenmeier, Edwards, Smith, and Dennis.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws

7098, 7107.

65 Id. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. 1983), for a court's summary of the
legislative history of Rule 609.
66 120 CONG. REC. S40069 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
67 120 CONG. REC. H40891 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate).
68 See 120 CONG. REc. S37077-79 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974)(statements of Senators McClellan,
Hart, Hruska, and Burdick). See also 120 CONG. REC. H40891, H40894 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)
(statements of Representatives Hungate and Dennis).
69 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10, (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7103.
70 Id.
71 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974), repintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG
& ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7103.
72 Id, rerinted at 7051.
73 120 CONG. REC. H40890, H40891 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate).
74 The Senate Judiciary amended the House version which permitted prior convictions only if
the offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, involved dishonesty or false statement. The modified
version maintained that prior conviction evidence of crimen falsi crimes could be admitted against a
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accept the compromise version
read into it their own concerns, exemp75
tions, and interpretations.Moreover, amending the Conference Committee version to clarify
legislative intent was not even an option once the rules came back to
Congress. The rules were proposed to both legislative bodies with the
understanding that any compromises already made should not be upset
and that the rules should be passed as one body of law, whether or not
there was agreement on all the specific aspects therein. 7 6 Significantly,
however, both houses agreed that even though the language of the rules
was disputed in the legislature, the rules should be interpreted in accordance with the overriding Congressional purpose of securing fairness in
administration. 77 Thus, the common-law rule allowing for blanket admissibility of prior conviction evidence in civil trials was arguably rejected by both legislative bodies in favor of allowing judicial discretion
78
where necessary to "secure fairness."
The difficulty in applying Rule 609(a) results from imprecise drafting, 7 9 from a confusing legislative history, 80 and from the conflicting policies underlying the rule. 8 1 The rule is designed to prevent undue
prejudice and to reduce the deterrent effect that prior conviction evidence has on a defendant-witness' decision to testify. 8 2 At the same time,
it is intended to give the jury all available information about the witness
so the jury may determine his or her credibility. 83 It is the subjective
balancing of these conflicting policies that has led the circuit courts to a
hopeless split in their treatment of admitting prior conviction evidence in
civil trials.
criminal defendant, while other witnesses could be impeached by non-crimen falsi prior conviction
when the probative value of such evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect against the party offering
the witness. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, (1974) reprintedin 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7061. See also supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the Senate's consideration and treatment of Rule 609(a).
75 Smith, supra note 53, at 455.
76 See 120 CONG. REC. H40896 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Smith); 120 CONG.
REC. S40069 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
77 See 120 CONG. REC. S40069 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (stressing the
importance of serving the purpose of the Federal Rules), and 120 CONG. REC. H40896 (daily ed.
Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Smith) (indicating that the federal courts are "well-designed" to
meet the purpose of the Federal Rules as stated in Rule 102). For the adopted language of the
Congressional purpose provisions, see FED. R. EvID. 102 and 611 (a), quoted supra note 4.
78 See generally Smith, supra note 53, at 455. It is also important to note that only ten Representatives, see 120 CONG. REC. H2381 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974), and only slightly more than one-third of the
Senators, see 120 CONG. REC. 837083 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974), endorsed the common-law rule of
mandating admission of all prior convictions.
79 See Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 n.l (D. Md. 1983) (adopted language of Rule 609(a)(1) was the result of a legislative oversight).
80 See supra notes 42-78 and accompanying text.
81 See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 609[01] at 609-49 to -50. See also United
States v.Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (courts must reconcile competing policies
of (1) encouraging defendants to testify by protecting them against unfair prejudice, with (2) protecting the government's case against unfair misrepresentation of non-criminality).
82 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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III.

Current Treatment of Prior Conviction Evidence in Civil Cases:
Analysis of the 609(a)(1) - 403 Dilemma
A.

Court Treatment of Admissibility Under Rule 609(a)(1)

Rule 609(a)(1) does not explicitly define the scope of admissible
prior conviction evidence.8 4 However, courts have traditionally admitted
only the name of the crime, its classification, when and where it took
place, and the corresponding punishment received, regardless of the witness testifying.8 5 But while the courts are in agreement as to the extent
of the admissible prior conviction evidence, there is great disparity
among the courts as to when and under what authority such evidence is
admissible in civil cases.
1. Automatic Admissibility Against Civil Parties
The Third Circuit has held that prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes are automatically admissible for impeachment purposes against civil plaintiffs. In Diggs v. Lyons, 86 since the affected party
was a civil plaintiff rather than a "defendant," the court held that it was
Congress' intent that "except in cases of possible prejudice to the defendant, judges were to have no more discretion in admitting evidence of
felony convictions than evidence of crimen falsi .... ,"87 The majority's
justification for its reading stemmed from its determination that the
"specific" language of Rule 609(a)(1) preempted the "general" language
8
of Rule 403 in civil cases.1
The court's emphasis on the fact that the party affected by this issue
in Diggs was a civil plaintiff and not merely a civilparty and the fact that the
court relied on the literal, plain meaning language of Rule 609(a)(1) in
reaching its decision,8 9 suggests that the Third Circuit may not necessarily favor blanket admissibility with regard to a civil defendant. 90 The
84 See supra note 8 and accompanying advisory committee's note.
85 See generally 98 CJ.S. Witnesses § 507(c) (1957 & Supp. 1987); LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
14, § 319 at 349-52. See also Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE LJ. 763, 776 (1961). However, the witness is often allowed to make a brief denial of guilt. See
MCCORMICK,

supra note 2, § 43 at 99.

86 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
87 Id-at 582. The Third Circuit noted that courts have upheld the mandatory admissibility of
prior felony convictions against prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, and stated, "tiheir rationale
applies equally to the treatment under Rule 609(a) ofplaintiff's witnesses in a civil case." Id. (emphasis added).
88 The Third Circuit cited its Wong determination that Rule 403 was not designed to override
more specific rules, and that "Rule 609(a) is such a specific rule." Id. at 581 (citing United States v.
Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1983). The court went on to stress that no distinction should be
made between civil and criminal cases under Rule 609(a). See id. at 582. For an additional discussion
of Diggs, see Note, Diggs v. Lyons: The Use of Prior Criminal Convictions To Impeach Credibility in Civil
Actions UnderRule 609(a), 60 TUL. L. REV. 863 (1986).
89 Rule 609(a)(1) provides balancing for prejudice only to the "defendant;" it does not distinguish between criminal and civil defendants in the plain language of the rule. See supra note 8 for the
full text of Rule 609(a). The Third Circuit indicated its reliance on the plain meaning by stating,
"We have felt compelled to give the rule the effect which the plain meaning of its language and the
legislative history require." 741 F.2d at 582.
90 The question of whether prior convictions are also automatically admissible against civil defendants was not directly resolved by the Diggs court. 741 F.2d at 578-82. Indeed, the court at one
place in its opinion implied that its holding was limited to civil plaintiffs. See supra note 87.
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court even recognized that blanket admissibility of all felony convictions
for impeachment purposes "may in some cases produce unjust and even
bizarre results." 9' Yet, it justified its holding by placing the responsibility of amendment on the legislature rather than on the courts.92
Even if Diggs did not go so far as to apply a standard of automatic
admissibility of prior conviction evidence offered to impeach all civil witnesses, it appears several other courts have. The most recent of this line
of cases, and in fact the most recent ruling on the 609 - 403 issue in
general, is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Campbell v. Greer.93 Because
Campbell represents a significant departure from the Seventh Circuit's
previous treatment of the issue, 94 a more detailed analysis of this decision will be provided here.
In Campbell, a State inmate brought a civil rights action against
prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment when the officials
failed to "deadlock" his cell after he had requested they do so in order to
protect him from a targeted "hit" by other inmates. 95 As a result, "hit
men" (fellow prisoners) entered his cell and stabbed him repeatedly.
The jury found for the defendants, and Campbell appealed in part on the
ground that the defendants' counsel should not have been allowed to
introduce evidence of the rape conviction for which he was then serving
time. 9 6

The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, first
evaluated the application of Rule 609(a)(1)'s prejudicial balancing standard to civil actions, and then examined the possible application of balancing under Rule 403. The court relied on the language of Rule 609(a)
91
92

741 F.2d at 582.
The majority in Diggs stressed:
But if the rule is to be amended to eliminate these possibilities of injustice, it must be
done by those who have the authority to amend the rules, the Supreme Court and the
Congress. We therefore leave the problem to them. It is not for us as enforcers of the rule
to amend it under the guise of construing it.
Id. Still, the majority received criticism for adopting a rule of blanket admissibility and for excusing
itself for so doing by charging Congress with the responsibility to change the rule. The dissent
emphasized:
That result, placing use of such evidence outside the reach of the district court's discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403, makes no sense whatever, for it mandates admission of such
evidence against totally disinterested witnesses testifying, for example, about whether a
light at an intersection was red or green.
No matter which way these ambiguous rules are interpreted, Congress is free to change the
interpretation by legislation.... Meanwhile, in those circuits which have interpreted the
two rules so as to achieve a reasonable accommodation in civil cases, that reasonable accommodation will stand. In this circuit, on the other hand, concededly bizarre results will
be mandated by our rigid application of Rule 609(a) in civil cases which were not of real
concern to Congress.
Id. at 583 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
93 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987).
94 The Seventh Circuit had considered the prior conviction controversy in civil cases twice
before. In Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985), it recognized the Rule 609 - 403
issue, but expressly refused to resolve it. Id. at 1289-93. In Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), the court affirmed the civil trial court's exclusion of the plaintiff's manslaughter conviction when offered to impeach credibility. Id. at 894-95.
95 831 F.2d at 701.
96 Id.
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and on the rule's legislative history9 7 to conclude that the balancing provision of Rule 609(a) does not apply to civil witnesses or parties. It
noted, "[t]he only prejudicial effect that the judge is to consider [under
Rule 609(a)(1)] in ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction is the
prejudicial effect on the defendant in a criminal trial; as to all other witnesses, prior convictions are admissible for purposes of impeachment
without any balancing test." 98
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit considered Rule 609(a)(1)'s possible preemption of Rule 403 in dealing with prior conviction evidence.
The court observed that if Congress and the Advisory Committee intended to deal exhaustively with using prior convictions to impeach a
witness' testimony in Rule 609, Rule 403 would not apply.9 9 The court
then reasoned:
If [Rule 403] overrides the express statement in Rule 609(a)(1) that
evidence of prior convictions shall be admissible unless prejudice to
the defendant outweighs the probative value of the evidence, then it
overrides the express statement in rule 609(a)(2) that evidence of
prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement is admissible
regardless of prejudice to the defendant or anyone else. Yet Congress
plainly decided that such evidence should be admissible regardless of
its prejudicial effect, even against a criminal defendant; and if it is admissible against a person facing the loss of his liberty and the humiliation of a criminal conviction it must also be admissible against a civil
plaintiff or other witness in a civil case.100
The Seventh Circuit viewed this as the "clinching argument" against the
applicability of Rule 403,101 concluding that Congress did not intend
Rule 403 to be used to undo the common-law rule of blanket admissibility. 10 2 Thus, the majority held that Rule 403 does not apply to the use of
prior convictions to impeach a witness' testimony in either a criminal or a
03
civil case.1
97 In particular, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the Conference Committee's consideration and
eventual rejection of the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness as a factor to be weighed in
determining admissibility. Id. at 704. For an additional discussion of the portion of the Conference
Report cited in Campbell, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
98 831 F.2d at 704 (emphasis added). Because the court addressed such admissibility with respect to "all other witnesses," the Campbell decision, in contrast to Diggs, can be read to express the
Seventh Circuit's view on prior conviction evidence as it pertains to all civil parties even though the
facts of that case concerned only the admissibility of a civil plaintiff's prior conviction.
99 Id. at 705. The court labelled Rule 403 as a "catch-all," noting that it "was not meant to
overlap, supplant, or contradict the policy premises of more specific rules such as Rule 609." Id.
100 I at 705-6.
101 Id at 705.
102 Id. at 706.
103 Id at 706. The court rejected the Fifth Circuit's decision in Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695
F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983), which treated Rule 403 as "cutting across" Rule 609 and the other rules of
evidence. For additional discussion of the Shows decision, see infra notes 116-119 and accompanying
text. The Seventh Circuit in Campbell criticized Shows, indicating that Shows "failed to note the comment of the Advisory Committee that Rule 403 is inapplicable where another rule has dealt exhaustively with the admissibility of a particular class of evidence." Campbell, 831 F.2d at 706.
It is important to note, however, thatJudge Posner received strong criticism for his resolution of
the Rule 609(a) - 403 conflict from one of the other two judges hearing the Campbell case, Senior
DistrictJudge Will, who was sitting on the case by designation. See 831 F.2d at 708 (Will,J., concurring). Judge Will cbjected that:
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2. Applying the 609(a)(1) Prejudicial Balancing Standard to Civil
Parties as well as to Criminal Defendants
Several courts have applied the balancing test of Rule 609(a) to all
witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings, without discussing the
possible application of Rule 403. For example the Sixth Circuit, in Calhoun v. Baylor, 10 4 affirmed the admission of a civil defendant's prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes, but justified the ruling by
omitting the words "to the defendant" from the balancing standard of
Rule 609(a)(1).10 5
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that the determination
of whether to allow or disallow the use of a prior conviction based upon
whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect in civil actions
is within the trial court's broad discretion. 10 6 That circuit has endorsed
If Rule 609(a) is read, through judicial patchwork, to apply only to criminal cases, I find
it illogical, as well as unnecessary, to conclude that Rule 403 is never applicable to prior
conviction evidence in civil cases. That conclusion is inconsistent with what some members
of Congress clearly intended as Judge Posner's opinion points out, as well as a number of
prior decisions....
I find it an "unacceptable implication" that so narrow a specific rule should be generalized to foreclose application of the broad provisions of Rule 403 in all cases. Rather, the
only acceptable implication for me is that Rule 609 forecloses application of Rule 403 only
to those specific circumstances to which Rule 609 is applicable.
Id. at 708-09.
In addition to the Seventh Circuit, two federal district courts have chosen to apply the automatic
admissibility rule with no prejudicial balancing whatsoever in civil cases. See Ball v. Woods, 402 F.
Supp. 803, 811 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (dictum), aff'd mein. sub. nom., Ball v. Shamblin, 529 F.2d 520 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241, 244 (M.D. Pa. 1982),
superseded by Diggs, discussed supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. However, when considering
Woods it is important to note that Alabama moved from being a part of the Fifth Circuit to become
part of the Eleventh Circuit in October, 1981. Act of October 14, 1980, P.L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994. Currently Shows, infra notes 116-1 19 and accompanying text, controls in the Fifth Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit has not yet considered the issue; thus, the districts in that circuit would seemingly be bound by Fifth Circuit precedent which was developed before the split, i.e., Woods. However, because the federal district court in that case only discussed the 609(a)(1) - 403 issue in dictum,
and because the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision without opinion, Woods arguably represents persuasive authority at best in the Eleventh Circuit. For additional discussion of these
decisions, see LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 14, § 316 at 324.
The district courts applying the automatic admissibility rule relied on the Conference Report's
indication that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the jury's need to
have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. See Woods, 402 F. Supp. at 811;
Garnett, 541 F. Supp. at 244. However, such reliance was apparently placed without consideration of
the context in which this Conference Report language appears; that is, by "nondefendant" witness,
the Conference Committee was referring to a prosecution witness in a criminal trial rather than to a
witness in a criminal trial rather than to a witness or party in a civil action. See supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, several states have adopted state rules of evidence which deal with the admissibility
of prior convictions but which allow for no balancing of probative value against prejudice whatsoever, for either civil or criminal parties. Florida, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon have adopted such versions of the Federal Rule 609(a). See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 15,
at 16-35. However, the Staff Note to Ohio's version of Rule 609(a) indicates that Rule 403 still
applies when determining the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in that state. Id. at 3, n.6.
104 646 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1981).
105 The court interpreted Rule 609(a) to mean that a prior felony conviction is admissible if "its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect." Id. at 1163. It is important to note also that the
Calhoun court stressed discretion at the trial court level by both broadly applying Rule 609(a)'s prejudicial balancing standard and labeling prior conviction evidence as "admissible" instead of
mandatorily "to be admitted." Id.
106 Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1981).
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such a balancing test for civil parties under both the Rule 609(a)(1) 0 7
and the Rule 403108 standard. Moreover the Seventh Circuit, which also
had initially ignored the criminal language in the rule when faced with its
application to civil parties, 10 9 has reconsidered the issue and reached a
different result in Campbell.11 0
At both the federal district court and the circuit court level, courts
recently considering the prior conviction issue in civil cases have refused
to apply Rule 609(a)(1)'s standard to civil parties. Thus, although Calhoun is still controlling in the Sixth Circuit, this approach seems somewhat outdated. 1 1
3.

Applying the 403 Prejudicial Balancing Standard to Civil Parties

The First, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth circuits have applied Rule 403 in
all civil cases, regardless of how the ambiguities of Rule 609(a) are interpreted. In Wierstak v. Heffernan 112 the First Circuit labeled as "certainly
appropriate" the trial judge's application of the Rule 403 balancing test
to determine the admissibility of the civil plaintiff's prior conviction. 113
107 See Gonzales, 658 F.2d at 359 (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's application of
Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test to civil parties). See also Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir.
1985) (calling "unfounded" the contention that Rule 609(a)(1) does not apply to plaintiffs in civil
cases).
108 See Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 116-119
and accompanying text.
109 The Seventh Circuit had previously paraphrased Rule 609(a) to omit the words "to the defendant," thereby applying 609(a)'s balancing standard to a civil plaintiff as well as to a criminal
defendant. See Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
110 Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987), discussed supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
111 See Note, PriorConvictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of FederalRules of
Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1063 n.2 (1986).
However, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested
that the prejudicial balancing standard provided in Rule 609(a)(1) applies to both criminal and civil
parties. See Green v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Although that court was bound by the Third Circuit's Diggs ruling, see text accompanying notes 8687, supra, the court indicated that were it not for the Diggs holding, it would analyze Rule 609(a)(1) as
follows:
Rule 609(a) expressly provides that previous felony convictions are not admissible for
purposes of impeachment unless "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant;" the words "to the defendant" refer to the person who was the defendant in the criminal case resulting in the felony
conviction; therefore, the [609(a)(1)] balancing test, and the exercise of discretion, is mandated in all cases, civil or criminal.
625 F. Supp. at 383 (emphasis added). Such interpretation is of little persuasive value today, however, because of the Diggs ruling for mandatory admissibility against civil plaintiffs in that circuit and
because no other circuit or federal district court has favored such an interpretation.
In addition, a number of states have adopted versions of Rule 609(a) which explicitly provide for
the balancing standard of 609(a)(1), i.e., balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, to be
applied to civil as well as to criminal parties. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont use such a standard uniformly across witnesses, while
West Virginia applies such balancing against prejudice solely to witnesses other than a criminal defendant. See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 3, 16-35. However, these states have revised the
Federal Rule 609(a) to reflect universal application; they have not merely applied the present, criminally-focused 609(a)(1) standard to civil parties as the Sixth Circuit has in Calhoun.
112 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986).
113 lMEat 972. The court found the argument that Rule 609 mandates admission of prior convictions in a civil trial to be unpersuasive. Prior to Wierstak, the First Circuit had refused to resolve the
Rule 609(a)(1) - 403 issue on two previous occasions. In Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (Ist Cir.
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The Fourth Circuit, in Abshire v. Walls,' 14 referred to the district court's
exclusion of a civil plaintiff's prior conviction under Rule 609's balancing
standard, but went on to affirm that court's decision under Rule 403.115
Similarly, in Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 116 the Fifth Circuit maintained that
17
Rule 403 "is a rule of exclusion that cuts across the rules of evidence,"'
and that Rule 403 consequently pervades Rule 609(a)(1) and implicitly
the other federal rules, whether or not Rule 609(a) (1) applies to civil litigants. 1 8 The court went on to affirm the notion that great deference
should be given to a trial judge's weighing of evidence using the Rule
403 criteria."19
Likewise, first in Czajka v. Hickman,' 20 citing Shows, and then three
months later in Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,12 1 the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals has held that Rule 609 does not foreclose the district court's
duty under Rule 403 to weigh the probative value of the evidence against
the danger of unfair prejudice. 2 2 However, the court expressly refused
in those cases to address the issue of whether Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing
test was intended to protect only criminal defendants and not civil litigants. 123 The court deemed that resolving such an issue was simply unnecessary once it had determined that Rule 403 must be applied in civil
cases when a party seeks to cross-examine another about prior criminal
24
convictions.
1979), the court noted the 609(a)(1) - 403 conflict, but declined to use its opportunity to resolve it,
holding that whatever error there may have been in excluding the prior convictions in that case was
harmless. Id. at 93. Similarly, six years later that circuit passed up another opportunity to interpret
Rule 609(a)(1)'s applicability to civil litigants, in Linskey v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir. 1985).
The court in Linskey merely gave deference to the trial court on the prior conviction issue, and held
that "the court in its discretion under Rule 403," could exclude prior conviction evidence. Id at
202. The First Circuit refused to specifically determine whether the district court retained Rule 403
discretion in these matters until Wierstak.
114 830 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1987).
115 The court in Abshire never resolved Rule 609's applicability in a civil proceeding. The court
explained:
The district court reasoned that Abshire's prior convictions should be excluded because their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. This reasoning, however, is
also pertinent to excluding evidence under Rule 403.... We, therefore, need not resolve
Rule 609's applicability in a civil proceeding if Abshire's prior criminal record would be
properly excluded under Rule 403.
Id. at 1281.
116 695 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983).
117 Id. at 118.
118 Id. at 119.
119 Id at 118.
120 703 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1983).
121 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983).
122 See Czajka, 703 F.2d at 319; Radtke, 707 F.2d at 1000. The Eighth Circuit in Czajka stressed
particularly that even if the intended focus of Rule 609 is avoidance of prejudice to criminal defendants, it does not mandate a "mechanical and restrictive result when the party facing the potential
prejudice is one other than a criminal defendant." 703 F.2d at 319 (citing Tussel v. Witco Chemical
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983 (W.D. Pa. 1983). For additional consideration of the Tussel court's
treatment of the 609(a)(1) - 403 issue, see infra note 124).
123 Czajka, 703 F.2d at 319; Radtke, 707 F.2d at 1000.
124 See Czajka, 703 F.2d at 319. One additional circuit has thus far hinted at its solution to the
Rule 609(a)(1) - 403 conflict in civil cases. The Ninth Circuit, in U.S. v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th
Cir. 1976), considered the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in criminal cases, but noted in
dictum 403's possible applicability in a civil action. The court indicated that it is "conceivable" that
Rule 403 might afford a trial judge discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction "even where
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B.

Commentators' Views on the PriorFelony Conviction Issue

Courts which have used the balancing standard of Rule 403 to exclude prior conviction evidence sometimes cite to Professors Saltzburg
and Redden for authority. 12 5 Saltzburg & Redden have argued that since
Rule 609(a)(1) does not cover use of all convictions or prejudice to all
parties, it does not preempt application of Rule 403.126 They also sugthe defendant in a criminal case might not be the party prejudiced." Id. at 1083. The court in Dixon
additionally addressed the trial court's treatment of stale convictions and the interrelationship of
Rules 609(a) and (b). See id. at 1082-84. For a brief further discussion of Dixon, see Recent Decision,
22 Duo. L. REv. 535, 547 (1984).
In addition to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and perhaps Ninth circuits, several federal district
courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing standard in determining the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in civil cases. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found in
Boyer v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 603 F. Supp. 132 (D. Minn. 1985), was
bound by the Eighth Circuit's Czajka and Radtke ruling and likewise chose to avoid making any decision on whether the Rule 403 or the 609(a) balancing test specifically controls in a civil case. The
Boyer court did hold, however, that the plaintiff's prior conviction must be excluded "even under the
less stringent Rule 403 balancing test .... " Id. at 134. It is important to note also that Rule 403 is
commonly applied by the trial judge when the prior conviction evidence is being offered for purposes other than impeachment. See, e.g., Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1983) (where
prior conviction evidence is offered primarily to demonstrate motive and only incidentally to attack
credibility, the evidence may properly be admitted under Rule 404(b), and is properly analyzed
under Rule 403)).
Similarly to Boyer, in Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1983), the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland refused to examine the admissibility of a
prior conviction under Rule 609(a)(1), and instead applied Rule 403's balancing standard. The
court reasoned that "[t]he language of [Rule 609(a)(1)] does not require that it be applied in civil
cases ... ," id. at 921, and that "Rule 403 applies to any situation unless another rule absolutely bars
certain evidence or sets up a decision-making procedure that preempts any 403 weighing." Id. at
922. The Moore decision represented the first consideration of the 609(a)(1) - 403 controversy in the
Fourth Circuit; Abshire followed suit and now controls in that circuit.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania also refused to find
that Rule 609(a)(1) preempts Rule 403 in Tussel v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979 (W.D.
Pa. 1983). That court explained:
[W]e are not convinced that the language of Rule 609(a)(1) and its legislative history
mandate a mechanical and restrictive result when the party facing potential prejudice is one
other than a criminal defendant. This is particularly true in a civil case ...where questions
regarding the plaintiff's prior criminal conviction possess the likelihood of being tangential
if not clearly irrelevant.
Id. at 983. For a more detailed discussion of Tussel, see Recent Decision, supra. However, Diggs now
controls in the Third Circuit. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
Additionally, one state, Wisconsin, has selected Rule 403 balancing over the 609(a)(1) standard
in its adopted version of Federal Rule 609(a). The Wisconsin statute provides that prior conviction
evidence is admissible for impeachment purposes, but may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.09(1),(2). Similarly, although New Mexico has adopted Federal Rule 609(a) without modification, it applies Rule
403 balancing in assessing the admissibility of crimen falsi convictions under 609(a) (2). See State v.
Day, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142, 148, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Ohio,
and South Dakota have similarly viewed 403 as underlying their respective State Rules of Evidence
regarding prior conviction evidence. For a detailed discussion of state treatment of the admissibility
of prior conviction evidence, see generally JosEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 1-35; WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 14, 609112] at 609-132 to -194.
SALrZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2. See also Smith, supra note 53, at 459.

125

126

Saltzburg & Redden indicate:
[I]f Rule 609(a)(1) does not cover use of all convictions and prejudice to all parties,
nothing in this Rule explicitly states that it overrides other Rules ... and no good reason
appears to allow the government or civil litigants to be unfairly prejudiced. Hence, Rule
403 may be available to protect parties other than criminal defendants from unfair impeachment ....
In our view the special protection of Rule 609(a)(1) against use of prior convictions.., was intended to protect only criminal defendants, whereas the general notion [of
Rule 403] ...

was intended to reach ...

all parties ....

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:333

gest that the use of the word "shall" to describe admissibility in Rule
609(a)(1) was unintentional; therefore, trial judges should retain discre12 7
tion in admitting the evidence of a prior conviction.
The Saltzburg & Redden position has generally not been adopted by
other commentators. The support upon which Saltzburg & Redden rely
in forming the basis of their position has been criticized, 128 and the predominant view seems to be that Rule 609(a)(1) applies to both criminal
and civil cases. The Weinstein, 12 9 Louisell & Mueller, 130 and McCormick 13 ' evidence treatises each stand behind this broad interpretation.
The scholars Wright and Graham have also emphasized that Rule 609(a)
applies to all actions such that the admissibility
of prior conviction evi32
dence is beyond the scope of Rule 403.1
IV.

Turning to Policy: The Argument for Interpreting Rule 403 to
Underlie Rule 609(a)(1) in Civil Cases
Because the plain meaning of Rule 609(a)(1)'s language and the
rule's legislative history do not clearly define congressional intent as to
whether the rule should apply in civil cases, 13 3 courts should look to the
policies underlying Rule 609(a)(1), Rule 403, and the Federal Rules in
general to resolve the 609(a)(1) - 403 conflict. If applying Rule 403 to
prior conviction evidence in civil trials would be at odds with the policy
of a more specific rule, it should not be used.' 3 4 However, if application
would not clearly defeat a contrary policy, Rule 403 should be used as a
"safety net," to ensure that the purposes of the Rules in general are
met. 135
SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2, at 520.

127 See id., at 521. The suggestion that the phrase "shall be admitted" in Rule 609(a) was unintentional is perhaps supported by the fact that the other Federal Rules of Evidence seem to favor
discretionary rather than mandatory admissibility language. For example, relevant evidence "is admissible," FED. R. EvID. 402, and leading questions on cross-examination "should be permitted," id.
at 611 (c), while evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "may . . .be admissible," for certain
purposes, id. at 404(b), and specific instances of conduct going to a witness' credibility "may be
inquired into" on cross-examination, id. at 608(b). Certainly the exclusive use of discretionary language in the other Rules which deal with admission of a witness' prior conduct implies that the
mandatory 609(a) language could well be a legislative oversight. For additional support of this proposition, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (Conference Committee used
the word "may" rather than "shall" when paraphrasing Rule 609(a)(1)). But cf Smith, supra note 53,
at 460 (indicating that Saltzburg & Redden erred in viewing the "shall be admitted" language as
legislative error).
128 See generally Smith, supra note 53, at 459-61.
129
130
131
132

WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, at 609[06].
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 14, § 316 at 324-35.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 43 at 94.
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5214, at 263 (1978).

133 See supra notes 35-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguities surrounding
Rule 609(a)'s adopted language and legislative history. See also, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577 (1982), and Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444
U.S. 572 (1980) for illustrations of other legislative histories the Supreme Court has found to be
ambiguous.
134 See Note, The Placefor PriorConviction Evidence in Civil Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1267, 1279
(1986) (stressing that "if the application of Rule 403 defeats the policy underlying a specific rule, the
general rule cannot be utilized.").
135 See FED. R. EVID. 102 and 611, discussed supra note 4, for the expressed purposes of the
Federal Rules. In addition, the House and Senate agreed the overall purposes of the Federal Rules
would control in matters ofjudicial controversy. See also supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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The key inquiry in determining Rule 403's applicability lies in establishing whether there is a more specific rule that preempts that rule in the
civil context.1 3 6 As was previously discussed, the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test applies only to criminal defendants; 137 the rule offers no standard for the admission of prior conviction evidence in civil cases. Since it
is unclear just how Rule 609(a)(1) pertains to civil parties, the rule cannot be said to be "more specific" so that it would preempt Rule 403 in
that context. Arguments to the contrary have merely focused on the area
of evidence which Rule 609(a)(1) addresses, i.e., prior convictions, rather
13 8
than on its contextual application.
Allowing a judge to use Rule 403 to exclude prior conviction evidence in a civil trial would not interfere with the congressional policy
affording a criminal defendant protection under Rule 609(a)(1). 13 9 The
balancing test of Rule 403 is significantly different from that of Rule
609 (a)(1). Under Rule 403, the party arguing for exclusion of the conviction must persuade the trial judge that the danger of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.' 40 To the contrary,
under Rule 609(a)(1), the party arguing for admission of the evidence
has the burden of persuading the court that the prior conviction evidence
is more probative than prejudicial.' 4 1 Thus, the prior convictions of a
criminal defendant will generally be excluded under Rule 609(a)(1),
136 A statutory provision that applies to a specific situation will usually preempt a more general
rule that would otherwise apply; thus, Rule 403 should apply when no specific rule covers the issue
under consideration. See generally IA N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.16, at
373-74 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1985).
137 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of the Rule
609(a)(1) balancing test.
138 For example, the Third Circuit first determined that Rule 609(a) was "more specific" and
therefore preempted Rule 403 "insofar as [Rule 609(a)] required the admission of prior convictions
of crimen falsi of a defendant who testified in his criminal trial," in United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d
65, at 67 (3d. Cir. 1983). That circuit later applied the finding that Rule 609(a) was a "more specific" rule to the civil scenario in Diggs, see Diggs, 741 F.2d 577, at 581 & 582, discussed supra note 88
and accompanying text, even though Wong considered a contextual situation which was specifically
addressed in the rule, i.e., the admissibility of a prior crimen falsi conviction against a criminal defendant, while Diggs involved a contextual situation which clearly was not, i.e., the admissibility of a
felony conviction against a civil plaintiff.
The Seventh Circuit, in Campbell, discussed supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text, also generalized Rule 609(a) as "a specific rule governing the admissibility of convictions to impeach a witness' testimony." Campbell, 831 F.2d 700, at 705 (7th Cir. 1987). That circuit, like the Third Circuit
in Diggs, did not consider the contextual distinction between the criminal language in Rule 609(a)
and the civil proceeding at hand in establishing Rule 609(a) as such a "specific" rule.
In addition, the court in Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241 (M.D. Pa. 1982), discussed supra
note 103,justified its determination that Rule 609(a) is a more specific provision which consequently
preempts Rule 403 on the generic premise that "Congress wrestled with the problems raised by the
use of prior convictions [in Rule 609(a)]." Garnett, 541 F. Supp. at 244. The Garnett court exclusively emphasized the fact that prior conviction evidence is categorically dealt with in Rule 609 in
establishing Rule 609(a)(1)'s application to civil and well as to criminal cases. See id
139 See Note, supra note 134, at 1281. Rule 609(a)(1) was intended to protect only criminal defendants, while the general notion of balancing harm against helpfulness under Rule 403 was intended to protect all parties against undue prejudice. See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2, at 520.
140 FED. R. EVID. 403, quoted supra note 1; see also Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th
Cir. 1985).
141 FED. R. EvD. 609(a)(1), quoted supra note 8. See also 120 CONG. REC. H40891 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate) (Conference Committee placed "the burden on the proponent of such evidence to show that ... the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial
effect."), and United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
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while the convictions of a civil party under Rule 403 will generally be
admitted. 4 2 Using the balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1) in criminal actions and the balancing test of Rule 403 in civil actions would reflect both
the exceptional protection Congress intended for the criminal defendant
and the general congressional recognition that a civil party should
re43
ceive at least some level of protection from unfair prejudice.'
In addition to not interfering with the policy basis of Rule 609(a)(1),
applying Rule 403 in civil cases would best conform with the policies
underlying the Federal Rules as a whole.1 4 4 The Rules espouse a strong
presumption that probative evidence should not be excluded absent
compelling reasons, 4 5 and applying Rule 403 to the admission of prior
conviction evidence would ensure that any such compelling reasons were
considered. Moreover, as the Diggs court indicated, failing to allow Rule
403's balancing for trial concerns could allow "unjust and even bizarre
results."' 14 6 Without this balancing, prior conviction evidence which has
only little relevance to credibility in the case at hand could be admitted, 14 7 regardless of the unfair embarrassment or prejudice to the civil
witness or party. By preventing such undue prejudice and the possible
deterrent effect upon even civil parties and witnesses resulting from the
fear of embarrassment and prejudice, application of Rule 403 will further
advance the purposes of the Federal Rules: justice,
accuracy, and fair148
ness through judicial discretion and flexibility.
V.

The Optimal Solution: Revising Rule 609(a)

Although Rules 609(a)(1) and 403 can be interpreted so as to ensure
the fair administration ofjustice in civil cases, the optimal solution to the
609(a)(1) - 403 conflict lies in amending Rule 609(a) to better reflect
congressional intent towards admitting prior conviction evidence in both
criminal and civil contexts. Indeed, commentators 4 9 and judges 5 0 that
142 See Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1292 (indicating that Rule 609(a)(1) "leans heavily toward exclusion,
while Rule 403 leans heavily toward admissibility"). Although the court has considerable discretion
in applying Rule 403, that discretion should be used sparingly. See Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d
1227, 1242 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722-23 (1 1th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983). See also SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 2, at 139
(courts should balance maximum probative value against the likely prejudicial effect of the
evidence).
143 Note, supra note 134, at 1281. Congress has shown such recognition through its provisions
regarding character evidence. See supra note 43.
144 FED. R. EVID. 102. See also Gold, supra note 1, at 499 (Rule 403 intended to advance accuracy
and fairness through judicial flexibility).
145 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 79697 (8th Cir. 1980) (in weighing probative value against the dangers and considerations enumerated
in Rule 403, the general rule is that the balance should be struck in favor of admission).
146 Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582.
147 The Diggs court noted in contemplating the unjust results of mandatory admission of all felony convictions, that "[e]vidence that a witness has in the past been convicted of manslaughter by
automobile, for example, can have but little relevance to his credibility as a witness in a totally different matter." Id.
148 See FED. R. EvID. 102. See also Note, supra note 11, at 1078.
149 For example, Professor Irving Younger indicated that revision should take on a Rule 403
flavor: "[I] dare hope that Congress will someday amend Rule 609 along these lines: Any witness
may be impeached with convictions, subject to the judge's discretion under Rule 403." Younger,
Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFsTRA L. REV. 7, 12
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have considered the 609(a)(1) - 403 issue have stressed that Rule
609(a)(1) as written needs revision.
One possible revision of Federal Rule 609(a)(1) that would clarify its
intended application to civil as well as to criminal parties and that should
be examined in amending the current rule is reflected in Uniform Rule of
Evidence 609. The Uniform Rule allows for balancing prejudicial effect
to "a party or the witness" rather than merely "to the defendant" as
under the Federal Rule.15 1 However, this would provide the same level
of protection from prejudice to civil parties and witnesses as is currently
provided to criminal defendants, 15 2 and such was clearly not Congress'
intent in adopting the original prior conviction rule. 153 Arguably, civil
parties and witnesses in both civil and criminal trials should receive only
the level of protection from prejudice provided in the "substantially outweighs" standard of Rule 403, while criminal defendants should receive
the heightened protection currently provided in Rule 609(a)(1). In addition, it is questionable whether prior conviction evidence should be excluded because of its prejudicial effect to a witness who is not even
54
affected by the outcome of the litigation.
Another possible version of Rule 609(a), adopted at the state level,
would require a showing of relevancy of the prior conviction evidence
towards the issue of credibility, as well as a determination that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party of(1976). Moore & Bendix also argue that "the Conference Report and subsection (a)(1) is deficient in
that it cannot be sensibly applied in civil
cases," MOORE & BENDLX, supra note 42, § 609.14[4] at VI148.
150 Judge HenryJ. Friendly noted the language problems in Rule 609(a)(1) from the very beginning of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as he used the inconsistency between Rules
403 and 609(a) as an illustration of some of the problems with the rules. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: HearingsBefore the Special Subcommittee on Reform of FederalCriminal Laws of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 246, 251 (1973) (testimony of Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly),
reprinted in WEINSrEIN & BERGER, supra note 14 at 609-11 to -12. More recently, Judge Posner has
recognized that "Rule 609(a) can't mean what it says," in determining that the rule was in need of
some "judicial patchwork." See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703. Senior DistrictJudge Will, designated to
hear Campbell along with Posner in the Seventh Circuit, urged the rule be amended. Id. at 709 (Will,
J., concurring).
151 See Uniform Rule of Evidence 609(a), which provides:
(A) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (I) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party or the witness, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
UNiF. R. EVID. 609(a) (1974). For the adopted language of Federal Rule 609(a), see supra note 8.
152 Under current interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1), that rule's balancing standard is applied to
criminal defendants, and Rule 403's standard or no balancing standard whatsoever is generally applied to civil parties and witnesses. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text for the courts'
current treatment of the prejudicial balancing issue; see supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text
for the implications and differences in applying the 609(a)(1) versus the 403 standard.
153 Congress intended criminal defendants to enjoy elevated protection from the prejudice.of
prior conviction evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
154 When a party is impeached with prior conviction evidence, there is always a danger that the
jury will treat such evidence as character evidence. However, this danger is not generally present
when nonparty witnesses are impeached, since their propensities to act in certain ways are not relevant. See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 8. In addition, prejudice to a witness stemming
from revelation of his or her prior conviction was rejected by Congress as a factor to be considered
by the courts. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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fering the witness. 155 Such a rule would provide a uniform standard for
prior convictions of both felony and crimen falsi crimes. 156 However,
congressional intent to presume the relevancy of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes and to provide a lower level of protection for civil parties and witnesses than
for criminal defendants would
157
again be thwarted under this version.
To best meet the policies which underlie Rule 609(a) and the Federal Rules of Evidence 158
in general, the amended version of Rule 609(a)
should read as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a
crime and the nature of the crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination, but only if:
(1)(a) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, and
(b) the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the
jury that, regarding the admission of a prior conviction of the
defendant or a defendant's witness in a criminal trial, the probative value of admitting the witness' prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the criminal defendant, and such
a determination appears on the record;' 59 or, regarding the admission of a prior conviction of a prosecution witness in a criminal trial, or of any witness in a civil trial, the probative value is
not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the
party offering the witness; 160 or
155

Idaho has adopted such a rule, which provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be admitted if
elicited from him during cross-examination or established by public record, but only if the
court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to his credibility and
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
party offering the witness. If the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not
the nature of the conviction, is admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the
action or proceeding, he shall have the option to present evidence for the nature of the
conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be admissible.

IDAHO R. EviD. 609(a).

156 Under the language of the Idaho rule, crimen falsi convictions could be excluded as a result of
prejudicial balancing, contrary to present policy of blanket admissibility for such crimes. See supra
note 32 for the current treatment of crimen falsi crimes under Rule 609(a)(2).
157 Congressional intent that prior convictions are presumptively probative of credibility is reflected in both the mandatory, "shall be admitted" language of the rule, see FED. R. EViD. 609(a),
supra note 8, and in subsequent court interpretation of the rule, see, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb,
702 F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (indicating that "Rule 609, on its face, strongly implies that a
prior conviction is per se probative of credibility for certain kinds of crimes").
158 This proposed version of Rule 609(a) is modeled, in part and with some exception, after the
present Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), supra note 8, the Uniform Rule of Evidence 609(a), supra
note 151, and the Idaho State Rule of Evidence 609(a), supra note 155.
159 Balancing for prejudicial effect to the defendant in a criminal case, regardless of whether the
defendant himself or the defendant's witness is testifying, eliminates the danger of derivative prejudice. For additional explanation of the derivative prejudice issue, see supra note 33.
160 The revised Rule 609(a) should apply Rule 403's prejudicial balancing standard to prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil trials. However, whereas Professor Younger advocated direct
reference to Rule 403 in the revised, civil context language of the rule, see supra note 149, indirect
reference to Rule 403's standard through the adoption of unambiguous language may be a more
effective resolution, given the presumed probative value of prior conviction evidence when offered
for impeachment purposes, see supra note 157. Spelling out Rule 403's balancing standard and ex-
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(2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
VI. Conclusion
An analysis of the plain meaning of the language of Rule 609(a)(1)
reveals no clear congressional intent mandating courts to apply the rule
to civil parties or civil witnesses. Likewise, an analysis of the legislative
history of that rule reveals no clear congressional intent that it be so applied. Consequently, Rule 609(a)(1) is not a "more specific" rule as it
applies to civil litigation, and therefore does not preempt application of
Rule 403 in the civil context.
Until Rule 609(a) is amended to clarify its application in civil actions,
courts should look to the policies underlying that rule and the other Federal Rules of Evidence to resolve the 609(a)(1) - 403 conflict. Reading
Rule 403 as a "safety net" that underlies Rule 609(a)(1) and all Federal
Rules which are not clearly more specific in dealing with the admissibility
of a particular type of evidence in a particular context ensures that the
overall objectives of the Federal Rules will be met in each cause of action.
Marlene B. Hanson

pressly limiting the standard's application to unfair prejudice would eliminate the potential for excluding a prior conviction on the basis of less compelling trial concern grounds which are also
considered in Rule 403. For the adopted language of Rule 403, see supra note 1.

